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The N.I.M.B.Y. Syndrome Meets the Preemption
Doctrine: Federal Preemption of State and Local
Restrictions on the Siting of Hazardous Waste Disposal
Facilities
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its
tendency to break and control the violence of faction .... By
a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.
James Madison, The Federalist Papers'
I. INTRODUCTION
In comparison to other environmental concerns, the safe disposal
of hazardous waste has only been recognized rather recently as a national
priority. In 1976, Congress passed the Solid Waste Disposal Act which
acknowledged the impact of the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air
Act on land disposal of waste.2 Renamed the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1980, the Act created "cradle to grave"
regulation of the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.
Congress' stated policy is two-fold: 1) reduce or eliminate the generation
of hazardous waste as expeditiously as possible, and 2) treat, store, and
dispose of hazardous waste that is generated "so as to minimize the
present and future threat to human health and the environment." 3 Since
the elimination of hazardous waste will probably remain only a dream
to our distant descendants, Congress' goal of safe disposal of such waste
represents the primary emphasis of regulations promulgated under the
Act.
One obstacle that has impeded Congress' policy is the hostility of
local communities to the location of hazardous waste disposal facilities
in their own particular city, county, or parish. This reaction is called
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) in Max Beloff ed., The Federalist or,
The New Constitution 41, 42 (Basil Blackwell, 1987).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (1988).
3. Id. § 6902(b).
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the "not in my backyard" syndrome, widely known by the acronym
NIMBY. The accent in NIMBY is on "my," which illustrates the peculiar
nature of this environmental response. The safe disposal of hazardous
waste is a goal common to all parties-Congress, EPA, industry, en-
vironmentalists, and consumers. Even local communities. support the
goal as long as the hazardous waste disposal facility is located in someone
else's backyard. The NIMBY movement has exploded on the political
scene in the last ten to fifteen years, 4 and the courts and legislatures
are struggling to balance the often legitimate NIMBY concerns against
the national policy of safe disposal of hazardous waste.
This comment explores the impact of NIMBY on the siting of
hazardous waste disposal facilities. In particular, the comment will ex-
amine the application of the constitutional doctrine of preemption to
attempts by state and local governments to ban or restrict the disposal
of hazardous waste. Finally, the comment will discuss whether the current
jurisprudence concerning preemption and NIMBY is rational or whether
alternative approaches are preferable. The courts' reliance on the pre-
emption doctrine reflects the tension between Congress' statutory scheme
for waste disposal and Congress' stated policy behind that scheme.
Preemption of state and local laws has been criticized by commentators,
yet it represents the only solution presently available to the courts in
light of the ambiguities of the system established by Congress. In the
interest of focusing on preemption, this comment will not address the
closely related issue of the impact of the dormant commerce clause on
the NIMBY syndrome.
II. THE NATURE OF NIMBY
NIMBY is a recent phenomenon. The rise of the syndrome parallels
the general decline of public trust in both government and business that
began in the 1960s. Vietnam and Watergate changed forever the way
that citizens relate to their leaders. Love Canal, Times Beach, and Three
Mile Island had the same effect on our perceptions of the business
community. NIMBY is a well-founded recognition that government and
business are either unwilling or unable to protect the public from harm.
Indeed, in the environmental field, NIMBY recognizes that government
and/or business may actually harm the public.
NIMBY is not confined to the siting of hazardous waste disposal
facilities. Communities are also blocking the location of half-way houses
for prisoners, half-way houses for the mentally ill, homes for unwed
mothers, nuclear plants, sewage treatment plants, recycling plants, power
4. A March 28, 1992 NEXIS search request found 1,398 newspaper and magazine
articles that mention the term NIMBY. As of January 1, 1982, NIMBY was found only
three times.
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transmission lines, animal feed lots, etc.5 Collectively, these activities
are referred to as "locally unwanted land uses." '6 Like hazardous waste
disposal facilities, the utility of these activities is beyond dispute-as
long as they are located in someone else's backyard. While each different
"locally unwanted land use" may engender different fears in the com-
munity, a common fear behind all NIMBY movements is that property
values will fall in the proximity of the "locally unwanted land use."
Hazardous waste disposal facilities have the additional spectres of air
pollution, ground-water pollution, and aesthetic harm.7
When viewed as a breakdown in public trust, the NIMBY syndrome
has three basic causes. First, free market responses do not work properly
when the issue is the siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility or
other "locally unwanted land uses.' Ideally, the NIMBY syndrome
would merely drive up the price of land until the compensation is
adequate to overcome local fears. However, the continued vitality of
NIMBY after fifteen years indicates that the market system is mal-
functioning. One reason is that some hazardous waste disposal facilities
are public facilities and thus operate on a not-for-profit basis. 9 Addi-
tionally, hazardous waste disposal facilities must be approved by the
local government and the local officials are reluctant to campaign as
the person who allowed the community to be turned into a dump.'0
Finally, the free market is affected by the strong bureaucratic bias to
avoid controversial decisions." A second cause of the NIMBY syndrome
is the failure of most states to impose siting standards on unwilling
local communities.' The third cause stems from the failure of traditional
tort law to address the damages of people near "locally unwanted land
uses" in a fashion that is either timely or financially adequate. 3
This brief review of the causes of NIMBY is sufficient to show that
NIMBY is a rational reaction to a real problem. And even though the
NIMBY syndrome generally asserts itself at the grass roots level with
5. Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D.
L. Rev. 198, 204 (1990); Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem
of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 437, 438 (1988).
6. Brion, supra note 5, at 437.
7. Jonathan P. Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal
Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 Geo. L.J.
567 (1991). While this Note concerns solid waste disposal, it is reasonable to conclude
that a hazardous waste disposal facility would instill similar fears to an even greater
extent.
8. Delogu, supra note 5, at 204.
9. Id. at 206.
10. See Delogu, supra note 5.
11. Brion, supra note 5, at 443.
12. Delogu, supra note 5, at 202.
13. Brion, supra note 5, at 497.
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minimal funding, the impact on the hazardous waste disposal facility
siting process has been enormous. One study of forty-seven states found
that of eighty-one applications for commercial hazardous waste treatment
and disposal facilities only fourteen had been approved, and only six
facilities were actually operating.' 4 Under a Massachusetts siting process
specifically designed to defuse the NIMBY syndrome by addressing local
concerns, all five hazardous waste disposal facility applications approved
by the siting authority ultimately failed as a result of public pressure. 5
More often it is not necessary to defeat a siting proposal because simple
delay, or the threat of delay, is sufficient to force the developer to
withdraw. 6
If one starts with the premise that the safe disposal of hazardous
waste is a positive achievement, one must conclude that successful NIMBY
challenges to proposed hazardous waste disposal facilities are harmful
to the public, unless the challenge is based on bona fide health concerns.
The defeat of the proposal does not stop the creation of hazardous
waste, and if the waste cannot be disposed of in a licensed, regulated
facility, what happens to it? Common sense and economic considerations
suggest that the success of NIMBY leads to illegal dumping which leads
to health and public safety problems. 7
III. THE NATURE OF PREM'TION
The preemption doctrine arises from the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution which makes "[this Constitution, and the
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof...
the supreme law of the land; ... laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding."'" In interpreting the supremacy clause, the courts will
find that federal law preempts state/local law in three different ways.
First, Congress' statutory language may expressly preempt state law.' 9
Second, courts will imply preemption from the structure and purpose
of the statute. If the statute sets up a regulatory scheme so pervasive
that Congress has "occupied the field," state law in the field is preempted
by implication3 ° Finally, even if Congress has neither expressly nor
implicitly preempted other law, state/local laws are preempted to the
14. Jonathan R. Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State
Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1990).
15. Brion, supra note 5, at 448.
16. Id. at 453.
17. Delogu, supra note 5, at 200.
18. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl 2.
19. Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461, 469, 104 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (1984).
20. Id.
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extent that they conflict with federal law.2' Such conflict exists whenever
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible and also when
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'
Generally, federal environmental statutes set minimal standards that
must be met by the states while permitting the states to enact more
stringent regulations.2 3 Such floor preemption recognizes that state and
local governments may wish to impose stricter standards and that these
stricter standards do not interfere with Congress' overall policy. 4 RCRA
also contains a provision certifying the retention of state authority:
.. no State or political subdivision may impose any requirement
less stringent than those authorized under this subchapter ....
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State
or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements,
including those for site selection, which are more stringent than
those imposed by such regulations. 25
This quoted section does not differ substantively from similar sections
in the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act; yet, the preemption issue
has arisen only under RCRA. The explanation for this apparent incon-
sistency can be found by referring to the purposes of the various
programs. The primary goal of the Clean Air Act is to enhance air
quality through the prevention of pollution.26 The Clean Water Act seeks
to restore and to maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity.
of the nation's waters. 2" As stated above, the policy behind RCRA seeks
to minimize the threat of hazardous waste disposal to human health
and the environment.?
More stringent local standards under the Clean Water Act or the
Clean Air Act will further Congress' purpose. But when local govern-
ments set overly stringent site selection standards under RCRA, they
frustrate Congress' goal by interfering with the safe disposal of hazardous
waste. This potential conflict falls under the third prong of the pre-
emption doctrine if the local statute "stands as an obstacle to the
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941)).
23. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1988) (stationary sources only); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
24. For an exception to the general rule, see 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (Clean Air Act) which
limits state authority to enact stricter regulation on mobile sources of air pollution. This
exception is a recognition of the fact that the automobile industry serves a national market
and could not respond to fifty-one different standards.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988).
26. Id. § 7401(b).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988).
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 2 9 Ironically, RCRA is the only one of the three programs
that expressly authorizes "more stringent" regulation by state and local
governments. Nevertheless, RCRA is the one program where the courts
have resorted to preemption to protect the program from those very
same "more stringent" standards.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF PREEMPTION IN THE HAzARDous
WASTE DIsPOsAL FELD
A. RCRA Preemption
In the landmark dormant commerce clause case of City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Court stated that
RCRA contained "no 'clear and manifest purpose of Congress' to pre-
empt the entire field of interstate waste management. . . ." At that
time (1978), the state authority section of RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6929)
contained only the restriction on "less stringent" requirements. The
positive statement authorizing "more stringent" requirements was not
made part of the law until 1980.11 The City of Philadelphia Court had
no need to explore implied preemption because it held that the dormant
commerce clause invalidated the statute which barred the importation
of waste. But the Court's dicta on express preemption was clearly correct
and that position was bolstered by the 1980 amendment to 42 U.S.C.
§ 6929.
The Louisiana Supreme Court was the first body to uphold a pre-
emption challenge to a local statute banning hazardous waste disposal
in Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish
Police Jury.32 The court found that state law preempted an Iberville
Parish ban on the disposal of hazardous waste. But the court went on
to cite RCRA and the congressional purpose of establishing uniformity
among the states in the field of hazardous waste disposal. This emphasis
on Congressional policy presaged the approach of the federal courts to
preemption challenges based solely on RCRA. Decided in 1979, Rollins
29. Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461, 469, 104 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (1984) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67,
61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941)).
30. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2534
(1978) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146,
1152 (1947)).
31. Stone, supra note 14, at 11.
32. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127
(La. 1979).
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preceded the 1980 RCRA amendment which authorized "more stringent"
regulations.
The most authoritative" statement on RCRA preemption comes from
the Eighth Circuit's 1986 decision in ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas.14 The
court upheld a permanent injunction against a Union County, Arkansas
ordinance prohibiting the storage, treatment, or disposal of "acute haz-
ardous waste" within the county." The court recognized the City of
Philadelphia dicta on express preemption, but went on to find an express
declaration of national policy on hazardous waste treatment, storage,
and disposal.M The court concluded that the state's authority to enact
more stringent requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 6929 applies only to
"good-faith adaptations of federal policy to local conditions. " 37 Use of
such labels as "more stringent requirement" or "site selection" in the
ordinance does not, by itself, authorize the local entity to "enact a
measure that as a practical matter cannot function other than to subvert
federal policies .... "8 The court indicated that it will look to the
language and history of the ordinance to determine whether it qualifies
as a "good-faith adaptation." ENSCO does leave the door open for
more stringent regulations but suggests that the courts will take a hard
look at such ordinances, especially when an ordinance imposes an out-
right ban, rather than a restriction, on hazardous waste disposal.
Ogden Environmental Services v. City of San Diego favorably cited
the language from ENSCO in ruling on an ordinance that was less than
an out-right ban. 39 The San Diego ordinance established a "conditional
use permit" that was mandatory even when EPA approval had been
obtained. The ordinance contained no meaningful standards for the
evaluation of such permit requests. The plaintiff corporation was denied
the conditional use permit for -a hazardous waste incineration facility
that had already been approved by EPA.4° The court recognized that
such a discretionary review creates the potential for sham, subterfuge,
and a de facto ban on the disposal of hazardous waste. 4 The court
concluded that RCRA preempted the ordinance. In the analysis of RCRA
preemption of state/local hazardous waste disposal facility statutes, the
33. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the preemption issue since
City of Philadelphia in 1978.
34. ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986).
35. Id. at 744.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Ogden Envtl. Serv. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1446 (S.D. Cal.
1988).
40. Id. at 1437-38.
41. Id. at 1446.
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Ogden court also looked to jurisprudence under other federal statutes
that set standards for the safe disposal of harmful materials, such as
the Toxic Substance Control Act.42
The "more stringent requirement" clause of 42 U.S.C. § 6929 is
not the only "savings clause" in RCRA. The Act also provides that
nothing in the citizen suit provision "shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement relating to the
management of solid waste or hazardous waste. ... '"4 In Sharon Steel
Corp. v. City of Fairmont, the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld a
municipal ordinance declaring that the permanent disposal of hazardous
waste was a public nuisance." The court relied on the language of the
citizen suit savings clause quoted above. The court's reliance on that
section seems misplaced, as the clause is clearly intended to preserve a
citizen's right to obtain nuisance relief and not to declare an entire
industry a per se nuisance.4
B. Hazardous Waste Disposal and Preemption Under Louisiana Law
Unlike RCRA's statutory scheme, Louisiana law expressly preempts
most facets of hazardous waste control. The Louisiana Hazardous Waste
Control Law (LHWCL) states that the Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) has exclusive jurisdiction over the development, imple-
mentation, and enforcement of a comprehensive state hazardous waste
control program." A major exception to this grant of authority is found
in the statutes governing local parish authority which restrict police jury
authority in the area of the generation, transportation, and disposal of
hazardous waste. In the field of hazardous waste, police jury power is
limited to the "initial siting of facilitfes pursuant to general land use
planning, zoning, or solid waste disposal ordinances. ' 47
Under state preemption law, the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution is obviously irrelevant. State preemption of local law
stems from the inherent authority of a superior legislative body to
override an inferior one when the two entities are in conflict.48 In
42. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988). See William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not in my
Back Yard" Syndrome: An Approach to Federal Preemption of State and Local Imped-
iments to the Siting of PCB Disposal Facilities, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 811 (1985).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1988).
44. Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E.2d 616 (W.Va. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 474 U.S. 1098, 106 S. Ct. 875 (1986).
45. Stone, supra note 14, at 12.
46. La. R.S. 30:2174(A) (1989).
47. La. R.S. 33:1236(31) (1989).
48. Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So. 2d 1218, 1227 (La. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1028, 110 S. Ct. 1476 (1990).
[Vol. 53
COMMENTS
Louisiana, local power is not preempted unless the state legislature
expressly intends preemption or the "exercise of dual authority is re-
pugnant to a legislative objective . . . . "49 Absent express preemption,
the courts determine legislative intent by examining: 1) the pervasiveness
of the state regulatory scheme, 2) the need for state uniformity, and 3)
the danger of conflict between the enforcement of the local laws and
the administration of the state program.50
The LHWCL expressly preempts out-right or constructive bans against
hazardous waste disposal. The exemption for the siting of facilities is
inapplicable because a ban does not involve the selection of sites or
even land use planning." And even if such an ordinance survived an
express preemption challenge, it would be implicitly preempted as re-
pugnant to a legislative objective. The LHWCL states that the enforce-
ment of a comprehensive state hazardous control program is its declared
purpose.5 2 Additionally, the Act declares that the chemical industry is
a "basic and essential activity" for our economy." An ordinance banning
the disposal of hazardous waste would bear little chance of survival in
this environment. The exception for the initial siting of facilities pursuant
to general land use planning may amount to no more than a grant of
ENSCO-like authority to the police juries-the authority to include good-
faith adaptations based on local concerns in the siting of hazardous
waste disposal facilities. We must also consider that the Louisiana Su-
preme Court is the only high court in the country that has cited Congress'
policy behind RCRA while preempting such an ordinance on state law
grounds.
54
V. THE PARAMETERS OF RCRA PREEMPTION: A CASE STUDY
Current jurisprudence clearly establishes that an out-right ban on
the disposal of hazardous waste is preempted under RCRA unless the
local entity is making a "good-faith adaptation of federal policy to local
conditions."" Ogden indicates that the same test will be applied to an
ordinance that can serve as a de facto ban on such disposal. A harder
49. Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482, 497 (La. 1990).
50. Id.
51. See La. Att'y Gen. Op. 91-394 (July 23, 1991). Avoyelles Parish Code § 10-6
bans the disposal "in any way, shape, or form" of all hazardous waste. The AG opinion
states that the ordinance is expressly preempted by the LHWCL and that the "initial
siting" exception found in La. R.S. 33:1236(31) does not apply to a parish-wide prohibition.
52. La. R.S. 30:2172(B) (1989).
53. La R.S. 30:2172(A)(1) (1989).
54. Rollins Envtl. Serv. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127
(1979).
55. ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986).
1992]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
question that has not been clearly answered is: "How far can the local
entity go with more stringent requirements before it interferes with the
national policy of safe disposal of hazardous waste?"
EPA and the State of North Carolina recently litigated this question
in a dispute involving North Carolina's attempt to block the location
of a hazardous waste treatment plant in Laurinburg, North Carolina.
The dispute differed from prior preemption conflicts because North
Carolina operates its own EPA-approved hazardous waste program, 56
and the State was careful to construct a statute that scuttled the proposed
facility without jeopardizing EPA approval of its overall plan.57 The
dispute was also unique in that it was well documented during the
administrative battles between EPA and North Carolina which preceded
the litigation in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal.5"
Laidlaw Environmental Services proposed to build a facility designed
to treat both organic and inorganic waste, a process representing state-
of-the-art technology. 9 The plans called for the discharge of up to
500,000 gallons of waste-water per day into publicly-owned treatment
works which would then discharge the treated waste-water into the
Lumber River. The drinking water intakes of Lumberton, North Carolina
were thirty miles downstream from the proposed location. Local legis-
lators introduced numerous bills into the North Carolina legislature but
were faced with warnings from EPA that any moratorium on the issuance
of permits could result in the withdrawal of authorization for the state's
hazardous waste program. 60 In its final form, the disputed statute pro-
hibits the issuance of a permit if waste-water is discharged and is not
diluted by a factor of at least one thousand by the waters of the
receiving river. 61 The statute ignores any dilution through treatment that
may occur prior to discharge. It also contains a clause that any provision
of the statute that would cause the revocation of EPA authority for
the state's hazardous waste program would be void. 62 That provision
set the stage for the proceedings and litigation that followed.
The dilution requirement of the statute reduces the allowed discharges
at the Laurinburg site to 72,000 gallons per day, effectively destroying
the profitability of the proposed facility. EPA held a hearing on the
56. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988).
57. Douglas J. Snyder, The EPA-North Carolina Dispute: The Right of States to
Pass Stricter Laws Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 8 Va. J. Natural
Resources L. 171 (1988).
58. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(HWTC).
59. Id. at 1393.
60. Id. at 1394.
61. Snyder, supra note 57, at 173.
62. HWTC, 938 F.2d at 1393.
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withdrawal of its authorization based on allegations that the statute's
dilution requirement was arbitrary and on the fact that the statute did
not further the protection of human health or the environment.63 Because
North Carolina had an approved program, the subsequent proceedings
did not focus on the preemption doctrine, or the "more stringent re-
quirement" language of retained state authority, but rather on the
statute"4 and regulations65 governing EPA approval of state programs.
The statute states that EPA may not approve any state program that:
1) is not equivalent to the federal program; 2) is not consistent with
the federal program; or 3) does not provide for adequate enforcement.6
The relevant 67 provision in EPA's regulations declares that any state
regulation which both prohibits the treatment, storage, or disposal of
hazardous waste and is not based on human health or environmental
protection may be deemed inconsistent."
North Carolina argued that the "more stringent requirements" au-
thority of 42 U.S.C. § 6929 nullified the stricter "consistency" require-
ments of the federal regulations, and at least one commentator agreed.
69
During the hearing process, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 seemed to be North
Carolina's only protection, as EPA claimed that the dilution requirement
would render eighty-five percent of the potential sites in North Carolina
off-limits. 70 In a surprising 7' turn of events, the administrative law judge
(ALJ) ruled in favor of North Carolina, and EPA adopted the ALJ's
determination. The ALJ's finding concentrated on the literal language
of the regulation which says in order for EPA to reject a state program
on consistency grounds, the program must meet both requirements of
the regulation. First, it must not be based on human health or envi-
ronmental protection, and second, it must prohibit the treatment, storage,
or disposal of hazardous waste.72 The AL found that, under the statute,
Laidlaw could build the facility elsewhere in North Carolina, or build
a smaller facility at the original site, and thus the "prohibition" re-
quirement of the regulation was not met.
73
63. Id. at 1394.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988).
65. 40 C.F.R. § 271.4 (1991).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988).
67. The court also rejected Laidlaw's contention that the statute unreasonably restricted
interstate commerce under 40 C.F.R. 271.4(a) (1991).
68. 40 C.F.R. 271.4(b) (1991).
69. Snyder, supra note 57, at 177.
70. Id.
71. Id. generally. The commentator treats the dispute as a battle between EPA and
North Carolina (the article pre-dates the litigation) and paints a picture of EPA hostility
to the statute.
72. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390, 1394 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
73. Id.
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Laidlaw petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of EPA's determi-
nation, but EPA's about-face on the statute put the company in the
weakened posture of challenging an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation. Predictably, the court deferred to EPA's interpretation, find-
ing it reasonable and consistent. The court noted that RCRA mandates
consistency, not uniformity, and cited the "more stringent requirement"
clause of 42 U.S.C. § 6929.74 The court concluded that EPA's inter-
pretation of "consistency" means that "a state law 'acts as a prohibition'
on the treatment of hazardous wastes when it effects a total ban on a
particular waste treatment technology within a State, and nothing more.""
A broad reading of this case would eviscerate the preemption doctrine
as a check on the NIMBY syndrome in that only total bans on different
aspects of hazardous waste disposal would be prohibited. Additionally,
following the literal interpretation of EPA's own regulation, a total ban
would be permissible if it were based on human health or environmental
protection. This conclusion is at odds with ENSCO and Ogden where
generalized environmental concerns were held insufficient to ban the
disposal of hazardous waste.
The Hazardous Waste Treatment Council court upheld a state statute
while ENSCO and Ogden both dealt with local ordinances. While 42
U.S.C. § 6929 grants the "more stringent requirement" authority to
states and political subdivisions, the courts may be more receptive to
such requirements when imposed by a state. A state with an EPA-
approved RCRA program has already assumed the burden of addressing
its own NIMBY problems within the state. However, in National Solid
Waste Management Association v. Alabama Department of Environ-
mental Management,7 6 the Eleventh Circuit struck down certain Alabama
waste pretreatment regulations as preempted by federal law. The Ala-
bama standards were more stringent than EPA's standards because Al-
abama did not recognize pretreatment variances established by EPA
under RCRA. While the Alabama case also contained dormant commerce
clause considerations, it established that a court will apply the preemption
doctrine against a state as well as a political subdivision.
The particular facts and the posture of the parties before the court
distinguishes the Laidlaw dispute from earlier cases. First, the facts are
not clear as to the extent to which the statute banned such facilities.
EPA originally claimed that eighty-five percent of the potential sites for
the facility were eliminated. However, the court cites the ALJ's finding
that only 152 of the 485 riparian miles (thirty-one percent) in North
74. Id. at 1396.
75. Id. at 1395.
76. National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 910 F.2d
713 (lth Cir. 1990), modified by 924 F.2d 1001, reh'g denied, 932 F.2d 979 (1991).
[Vol. 53
COMMENTS
Carolina were made unavailable under the Act." It is not clear whether
the remaining areas could handle a facility of the size proposed by
Laidlaw. A similar case could hinge on the percentages involved because
at some point a restriction must be considered a de facto ban. The
posture of the parties was another unique feature of the dispute because
North Carolina already had an approved plan and thus fell under 42
U.S.C. § 6929. Unlike ENSCO, the legal issue presented here was narrow:
was EPA's decision not to revoke North Carolina's approval reasonable?
In states without approved programs, statutes restricting technology or
practices approved by EPA will not reach the court in such a deferential
setting.
North Carolina's statute chiefly targeted South Carolina, a potential
waste exporter to the Laidlaw site. In the finest NIMBY tradition, South
Carolina retaliated with a statute banning the import of waste from
states that failed to dispose of their own waste, affecting North Carolina
and thirty-one other states. South Carolina officials explained that EPA's
decision in Laidlaw "betrayed" South Carolina.7 8
VI. PREEMPTION AS THE SOLUTION TO THE NIMBY SYNDROME
Even assuming that courts will continue to use the preemption
doctrine to overturn statutes that ban or severely restrict the siting of
hazardous waste disposal facilities, preemption is an unsatisfactory so-
lution to the NIMBY syndrome. Using preemption as a stick with no
corresponding carrot does nothing to address underlying conditions.
NIMBY is simply a symptom of a basic problem which must be ad-
dressed. NIMBY is the logical reflection of the fact that the benefits
of hazardous waste disposal facilities are felt nationwide but the costs
fall on a small population in the proximity of the facility. Our economic/
political system has failed to socialize the costs of these absolutely
essential facilities, 9 and consequently, affected parties respond to every
real or perceived risk by using the political system to delay the approval
of the facility. The risks associated with these facilities cannot be reduced
to zero; there are no perfect sites.8 0 The inevitable NIMBY reaction to
all "locally unwanted land uses" floods the system with complaints of
varying degrees of validity. These disputes are not decided on the merits;
rather, members of cohesive affluent communities generate the political
power to delay the "locally unwanted land use," while less cohesive
77. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390, 1394 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
78. Stone, supra note 14, at 2-3.
79. Brion, supra note 5, at 498.
80. Delogu, supra note 5, at 208.
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and/or less affluent neighborhoods bear the burden of the "locally
unwanted land use."'8
While the solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this paper,
a survey of possible solutions is helpful in focusing the issues and
determining what policies should be considered when using the preemp-
tion "stick." Suggested solutions to the problem center on addressing
the fears of the local community so that the answer to hazardous waste
disposal facilities changes from "no" to "maybe, '8 2 or even "yes." 3
Commentators addressing the problem stress the need for greater
communication, usually through public representation on siting boards."
Public participation includes both permanent members plus ad hoc mem-
bers from communities near any proposed hazardous waste disposal
facility. While any increase in communication among developers, bu-
reaucrats, and the public is beneficial, the experience of the Massachusetts
siting board" teaches that representation alone is no solution. Recall
that all five proposals approved by the board were ultimately abandoned
despite public representation on the board.
In addition to increased communication, commentators recommend
negotiations between developers and the public, emphasizing compen-
sation to the communities. Developers might guarantee local property
values and maintain insurance policies to that effect.8 6 Communities
could demand that violations of permits will not be contested, with fines
going to a community trust fund. 7 Another anxiety-reducing concession
is for the developer to finance the community's employment of an expert
who will have some oversight authority for the plant's operations and
set up a procedure for the evaluation and implementation of the expert's
suggestions. 8 The community could also demand that the developer
ensure an overall reduction in pollution by financing pollution control
equipment for other, older facilities in the community. 9 And certainly,
the community should specify routes for access to the facility that ensure
against aesthetic degradation. These listed "indirect" payment incentives
can be supplemented by "direct" incentives such as increased taxes,
81. Brion, supra note 5, at 498.
82. Peter M. Sandman, Getting To Maybe: Some Communications Aspects of Siting
Hazardous Waste Facilities, 9 Seton Hall Legis. J. 437 (1986).
83. Marvin G. Katz, YIMBYism is Coming But . . ., 21 Waste Age 40 (1990)-a
look at market forces from the National Solid Waste Management Association's magazine.
84. Celeste P. Duffy, State Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Easing the Process
Through Local Cooperation and Preemption, 11 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 755, 800 (1984).
85. Brion, supra note 5, at 448.
86. Sandman, supra note 82, at 441.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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usage fees, and road and fire protection enhancement levies. 90 Such
proposals do not seek to restore public trust in business. Instead, the
community is using its valuable land resources to demand a more equal
partnership with the developer. 91
The state of Alabama and some commentators have looked to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA or Superfund) 92 as a couniterlto provincial NIMBY res-
ponses. CERCLA contains a provision that required all states to assure
(by October 1989) an adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment,
or secure disposal of all hazardous waste to be generated within the
next twenty years. 93 Alabama enacted legislation that banned the im-
portation of hazardous waste from any state which had not met the
CERCLA capacity assurance plan (CAP) requirement. In National Solid
Waste Management Association v. Alabama Department of Environ-
mental Management," the Eleventh Circuit struck down the ban as
violative of the dormant commerce clause, finding that Alabama's re-
quirement that out-of-state disposers obtain pre-approval was a signif-
icant burden on interstate commerce "[h]owever honorable and well
intentioned Alabama's leaders might be in coming to grips with envi-
ronmental problems." 95 The decision has been criticized by commentators
who propose such a plan as a solution to the NIMBY problem.9
However, an analysis of the case at a policy level indicates that the use
90. Duffy, supra note 84, at 785.
91. These proposals represent what is currently happening in the solid waste disposal
marketplace. Charles City County, Virginia recently agreed to host a regional landfill and
obtained the following concessions from the developer:
1. guaranteed host fee of $1.1 million annually (could go as high as $2.3 million
annually) for a county whose total tax revenues before the landfill were only
$1.5 million;
2. fund to monitor the Chickahominy River;
3. fund to close/monitor the landfill should the developer default;
4. free refuse disposal for all residents; and
5. replacement of local shallow wells with deeper wells.
Katz, supra note 83, at 41.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988).
93. Id. § 9604(c)(9) (1988).
94. National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 910 F.2d
713 (lth Cir. 1990), modified by 924 F.2d 1001, reh'g denied, 932 F.2d 979 (1991).
95. Id. at 725. The court also struck down certain pretreatment requirements on
preemption grounds because the regulations did not grant the same variances as did EPA
under RCRA. In a denial of a rehearing petition, the court noted that some of the EPA
variances had expired and thus the corresponding Alabama pretreatment requirements
were not preempted. The issue was remanded for a determination of the burden on
interstate commerce of those non-preempted restrictions. 924 F.2d at 1004.
96. Meyers, supra note 7, at 585; see also David M. Levy, Comment, Federalism
and the Environment: National Solid Waste Management v. Alabama Department of
Environmental Management, 12 Whittier L. Rev. 635, 668-73 (1991).
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of the CAP as a cudgel is a feasible approach only if the cudgel is in
the hands of the right party. Dormant commerce clause considerations
aside, state use of CAP based restrictions will invite retaliation and
internecine NIMBY warfare among the states.
Using the Superfund as an incentive at the federal level appears to
be the preferable approach. Hazardous waste disposal and the NIMBY
response present a national lproblem that should be addressed by the
federal government, despite the traditional reluctance to usurp local
control of land use regulation. The CERCLA CAP requirements can
be an effective starting point for an incentive/punishment system that
will encourage states to plan for the disposal of their own waste. Failure
to comply with CERCLA's twenty-year planning goal will trigger the
loss of Superfund money for non-emergency hazardous waste cleanups.9
7
This incentive carries a different weight in different states, ranging from
Mississippi's risk of $2 million to Florida's possible loss of $70 million."
The effectiveness of the incentive also depends on the willingness of
EPA to apply the sanction for lack of compliance and on the level of
scrutiny EPA applies to state CAP proposals. As of October 1991, all
fifty states had submitted CAP proposals and forty-seven CAP's had
been approved. As of that same date, no states had been denied Su-
perfund remedial funds under the CAP requirements of 42 U.S.C. §
6904(c)(9)."
Clearly, the Superfund incentive has not developed into the "potent
weapon" envisioned by some commentators. °0 Nevertheless, the use of
federal authority to coerce state action is the proper approach. The
enhanced communication and compensation schemes discussed above
must be implemented locally, but federal action could encourage the
states to formulate such programs. Federal action should require that
each state develop a plan for hazardous waste disposal facility siting
that incorporates a variety of the techniques discussed. The federal plan
should also include an effective threat of loss of funds for noncompliance
and the state plans should be under the approval authority of EPA. 0'
Congress should also incorporate the CERCLA CAP into the mandatory
requirements for EPA approval of state hazardous waste programs under
RCRA.
Both the Senate and the House versions of proposed changes to
RCRA seek to increase state/local authority over the disposal of haz-
ardous waste while the Bush administration opposes such changes. Both
97. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (c)(9) (1988).
98. Meyers, supra note 7, at 583.
99. Telephone interview with Kristen Fitzgerald, EPA Regulatory Specialist (April 7,
1992).
100. Snyder, supra note 57, at 189.
101. Delogu, supra note 5, at 212.
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Senate and House proposals would permit local governments to refuse
out-of-state waste shipments.'02 Facilities currently receiving out-of-state
waste would have grandfather rights as long as they comply with all
applicable state laws. Additionally, after a forty-two month waiting
period, states with approved RCRA programs would be allowed to
prohibit out-of-state waste shipments from states without an approved
program. 03 The Bush administration opposes such changes, insisting that
current RCRA authority is sufficient and warning that such policies will
lead to economic warfare among the states."" The administration believes
that tough new federal regulations will force smaller landfills to close
and thus mandate reliance on larger regional landfills. Barriers to the
interstate shipment of waste would interfere with the operation of these
new regional disposal facilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
NIMBY was born out of a righteous sense of indignation and has
had a positive effect in that developers are no longer free to elect the
cheapest mode of hazardous waste disposal without any concern for the
effect on human health and the environment. 05 However, due to the
inherent political and visceral distaste for the possible siting of a haz-
ardous waste disposal facility in "my" backyard, the pendulum has
swung too far, and NIMBY threatens the nation's health and safety by
interfering with the safe disposal of hazardous waste. While this comment
has reviewed several mechanisms for mollifying local opposition to the
rational siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities, those mechanisms
are available only to developers and state/local and federal governments.
These options are not available to the courts, which are left with
preemption and the dormant commerce clause-tools that seem crude
in an area where surgical precision is necessary to balance the bona fide
concerns of parties on both sides of the issue. Given the ambiguity
between Congress' stated RCRA policy of "minimiz[ing] the present and
future threat to human health and the environment," and Congress'
authorization of "more stringent" regulation by states and political
subdivisions, the courts have responded rationally by limiting the "more
stringent" regulation authority and applying the preemption doctrine to
invalidate ordinances that do not meet the courts' narrowed interpretation
of state and local power. No other currently available approach would
102. Current Developments, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2660 (Apr. 3, 1992).
103. Id.
104. Current Developments, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2196 (Jan. 24, 1992).
105. See Mariflo Stephens, When Issues Hit Home; LULUs, NIMBYs and Other
Angles on Neighborhood Activism, The Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1991, at DS.
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enable the courts to force all states and communities to share the burdens
of hazardous waste disposal.
Courts should temper the harshness of preemption in accordance
with the language in ENSCO which permits "good faith adaptations of
federal policy to local conditions."' 6 To protect the overall federal
policy, the courts must be vigilant to limit these good faith adaptations
to areas of specific bona fide local concerns that are based on public
safety, such as unique geologic, hydrologic, geographic, or physical
conditions that warrant placing an area off limits for hazardous waste
disposal.101 The generalized risk and fear that we all experience should
not, by itself, derail the development of responsible hazardous waste
disposal facilities.
The NIMBY problem requires congressional action, not jurispru-
dential patch-work based on an ambiguous statutory scheme. If Congress
truly intends to encourage a safe national disposal program while main-
taining state and local authority over land use, Congress must ensure
that each state develops a disposal program that adequately addresses
that state's disposal needs. Once a state has such a program, it should
be allowed to discriminate against states that do not. Once a state has
such a program, there will be no reason to use federal preemption of
local laws because the states will need some form of state preemption
of local laws to maintain their own program.
The current proposals before Congress may achieve this result. The
Alabama plan requiring all exporting states to have an approved CER-
CLA capacity assurance plan (CAP) also deserves consideration in that
no disposal program should be granted RCRA approval without an
approved CAP. Either of these plans-the Alabama plan or the pending
congressional proposal-presupposes that EPA will conduct a stringent
review of state proposals and closely monitor the state program after
approval. EPA's current record under the CERCLA CAP requirement
does not inspire confidence in EPA's ability or willingness to police the
states' waste disposal programs and enforce sanctions when necessary.
If Congress unleashes state/local "more stringent" regulation authority
without an effective review of state programs, NIMBY will lead to
economic warfare among the states.
Patrick O'Hara
106. ENSCO Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986).
107. Andreen, supra note 42, at 846.
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